Measuring health burden without discriminating against the disabled by Esposito, Lucio & Hassoun, Nicole
 1 
Measuring Health Burden without Discriminating Against the Disabled 
 
 
Lucio Esposito† and Nicole Hassoun 
 
University of East Anglia and SUNY Binghamton University 
 
 
Abstract. This paper addresses an ethical implication of 
some health metrics used for evaluating population health, 
with particular reference to the Disability Adjusted Life Year 
(DALY). Specifically, the paper considers the concern that, 
such measures may discriminate against the disabled. An 
analysis of this problem is offered, alongside the formulation 
of three principles upon which an alternative measure is 
developed –the Ethically Adjusted Life Year (EALY). 
 
Keywords. Health measures, Disability discrimination, 
DALY, Health interventions; Global burden of disease 
 
 
 
1. Background 
 
Summary measures of population health are important for health policy and planning. They 
can be used for many purposes including priority setting, evaluating population health over 
time, health system administration, and policy and planning –see Murray et al. (2000).  These 
measures typically combine information on mortality and disability (taken to include any 
diminishment in health status however minor or temporary) into a single metric. The measure 
we focus on is the Disability Adjusted Life Year (DALY) due to the wide interest it generated 
and its many applications (see Oostvogels et. al. 2015), although much of the discussion we 
carry out also applies to other health metrics. The DALY is the basis for the most 
comprehensive attempt to measure global population health, embodied in the Global Burden 
of Disease (GBD) study (Murray et al, 2012a,b, 2015), and is widely used for cost 
effectiveness analyses and to set medical priorities.  
 
This paper considers the objection that the DALY discriminates against the disabled; not only 
does the measure give less credit to (otherwise equivalent) health interventions that save the 
lives of disabled people, but it also gives priority to health-improving interventions over life-
saving interventions when the life at stake is that of a disabled person.1 This concern 
generated a body of literature arguing for avoiding disability-based discrimination –see Nord 
(1999 and 2001), Nord et al (1999, 2003 and 2009), Ubel et al (2000), and Johannesson 
(2001). In the words of Mont (2007), “The fear is that this fact will drive resources away from 
disabled people, making them even more vulnerable and disadvantaged than they already are 
in many societies” (p. 1658). 
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1 An additional disability discrimination objection is that the same amount of health care given to a 
person with a disability will often yield less health benefit for that person; this may be because some 
disabilities make it harder to successfully treat others. This second issue is beyond the scope of our 
paper –for a discussion, see Brock (2000 and 2009). 
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2. Methods 
 
We lay out a novel measure, which we label the Ethically Adjusted Life Year (EALY). Rather 
than lessening the degree of discrimination through a multiplicative functional form bringing 
about a revaluation or upper-end compression of health states (see Nord et al, 1999), this 
measure is developed using a fixed-plus-variable measurement framework adopted in welfare 
economics (see Bourguignon and Fields, 1997, Esposito and Chiappero-Martinetti, 2010 and 
Anderson and Esposito, 2014).2 This enables the researcher to introduce a discontinuity in the 
possible tradeoffs among bearers of value when one value is lexicographically more 
important than another. We outline and discuss three principles delineating the importance of 
alleviating disability and extending life-years (Disability Monotonicity, Life Egalitarianism 
and Life Supremacy). 
 
3. Results 
 
3.1 Summary measures of population health: the DALY 
The DALY is calculated by summing up i) years of life lost because of death occurring earlier 
than the approximately 80 years of age taken as benchmark (each year lost counts 1) and ii) 
years of full health lost due to disability (every year in non-perfect health counts between 0 
and 1 depending on the severity of the disability). The DALY measure reads as follows: 
 
DALY = YLL (Years of Life Lost) + YLD (Years of Life lost due to Disability) 
 
Imagine two people, h and d, who on their 60th birthday die of a heart attack. Both fall 20 
years short of the 80 years benchmark – and for them both YLL=20. However, while h has 
been healthy throughout all of the 60 years lived, at the age of 50 d became disabled. The 
DALY accounts for this disability-related health burden through the YLD component. These 
10 years count not as ‘full years’ but as ‘fractional years’: to each of these years a weight 
between zero and one is applied depending on the severity of the disability. While the YLD 
component for h would be zero (she has spent all of her years alive in perfect health), for d it 
would be 0.6*10=6 (assuming a weight of 0.6). The total burden for h would be 20+0=20, 
while for d it would be 20+6=26. 
 
3.2 DALY: assessing impact and evaluating interventions 
While it appears reasonable to say that the health burden was larger for d than for h, in the 
following two illustrations it is more difficult to accept the DALY’s evaluation of the 
outcome. This is because the existence of a disability automatically reduces the value of a life 
year of a disabled person. Since we address the discrimination brought about by the DALY 
between a healthy and a disabled person, our illustrations feature two individuals. The 
evaluation of longevity vs healthiness trade-offs for the same person does not present the 
same type of discrimination concerns and hence, whilst interesting, is not pursued in this 
paper.  
 
Health trumping life case. Imagine that on their 60th birthday d (who has a 0.6 disability) has 
a heart attack while h (who is completely healthy) has a stroke. Available resources only 
allow one intervention to be carried out. Not intervening on the heart attack would mean 
death for d while not intervening on the stroke would mean that h gets a 0.7-weighted 
disability. What should we do? The impact of acting on d would be 8 DALYs averted; the 
impact of acting on h would be of 14 DALYs averted. The DALY would favour the 
maintenance of h’s healthy state at the expenses of d’s life, a judgment reminiscent of 
Sparta’s cliff. Many find this behaviour undesirable because they believe sensitivity to the 
                                                 
2 An alternative approach, suggested by Johannesson (2001), differs from ours and was criticized by 
Ubel et. al. (2000), Norheim et al. (2012) and Ord (2013). 
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extent of disability should not translate into preference for a health improvement over life 
saving because the person whose life is at stake is disabled.3 
 
Lifeboat dilemma case. Suppose that both d and h face a life-threatening heart attack and due 
to resource constraints only one of them can undergo a life-saving procedure If we were to 
decide whether to act on d or on h on the basis of which intervention would maximise the 
DALYs averted, in the case of h the impact of the procedure would be 20*1=20, while in the 
case of d it would be 20*(1-0.6)=8. The procedure saves their lives and grants 20 additional 
life years to both h and d; but in the case of the latter it leads to less benefit because this 
person has a disability –and this would be so whether the disability is a major or an extremely 
mild one. This may be discriminatory, because the life of a disabled person counts for less 
than the life of a healthy person; prioritising the latter may also be unfair, for example, since 
on top of having enjoyed better health, h would also enjoy longer life than d. Note this 
critique does not require denying the existence of reasons for deciding to save h’s life. In this 
life-boat-dilemma type of situation where a (however tough) decision has to be taken, one 
could certainly argue that a world with h rather than with d would be a healthier world, or that 
the pressure on the health system would likely be lower with h alive rather than d. This 
lifeboat-dilemma illustration highlights a tension between the desirable behaviour of a health 
measure and that of a measure of the ethical value of health interventions –we shall come 
back to this tension below.  
 
3.3 Ethical principles for assessing impact and evaluating interventions 
In order to tackle the two types of discrimination discussed above, we lay out the following 
ethical principles:   
I. Disability Monotonicity (DM): disabilities should count according to their severity; 
more severe disabilities should count more than less severe disabilities.  
II. Life Egalitarianism (LE): an additional life year granted should count equally, 
regardless of the health status of the person; i.e. a k-year increase in the life of a 
disabled person should count as much a k-year increase in the life of a non-disabled 
person. 
III. Life Supremacy (LS): a life year saved counts more than any disability year alleviated; 
i.e. extending a person’s life by k years (whatever her disability) counts more than 
alleviating a disability for k years (whatever the disability). 
 
Note that we have laid out the above properties in ‘per year’ terms (i.e. granting 1 life year 
has priority over a 1-year health improvement). We do not blindly favour procedures which 
extend life for a short time over long-lasting health improvements –e.g. the treatment of a 
child’s disability can be given priority over saving the life of an elderly person. In addition, 
by ‘saving life/extending life/granting a life year’ we do not consider situations such as 
extending the life of a person in a vegetative state, where doubt can be cast on the value of 
such life years altogether. Understanding how to deal with futile care interventions is 
certainly an important issue, which, however, goes beyond the scope of our paper. 
 
The EALY builds upon the fixed-plus-variable framework proposed in welfare economics by 
Bourguignon and Fields (1997) in unidimensional evaluation and extended by Esposito and 
Chiappero-Martinetti (2010) and Anderson and Esposito (2014) in multidimensional 
evaluation. The EALY framework includes a fixed component reflecting the status of being 
alive and a variable component accounting for the degree of healthiness. The EALY reads as 
follows: 
 
                                                 
3 This should be intended in per-year terms, as will be clarified below, so that we are not comparing, 
say, extending life for 1 year against a health improving procedure yielding benefits for 30 years 
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EALY=LYA (Life Year Alive )+LYQ (Life Year Quality), 
 
For each individual, life is accounted for by the fixed component LYA and degree of 
healthiness by the variable component LYQ. LYA will be chosen as ≥α (we will suppose α=1 
in what follows) when the life year is spent alive (or when the life year is lost if we are 
measuring burden) and 0 otherwise. LYQ is a healthiness/unhealthiness parameter ranging 
from 0 to α depending on the health status of the individual, in a similar fashion to the 
disability weights used in the DALY. The variable component accounts for the severity of the 
disability and hence grants the accommodation of principle DM. Since LYA is fixed and is 
weakly greater than the maximum of the variable component, life-saving interventions are 
prioritised over health-improving ones, as prescribed by principle LS. When the choice is 
between two life-saving interventions regarding individuals with different health statuses (like 
h and d in our examples), discrimination against the less healthy is avoided (as prescribed by 
LE) as long as the components LYA and LYQ are interpreted as truly separate domains, as we 
shall clarify in Section 4 below.  
 
The choice of the exact value of LYA will depend on the degree of substitutability between 
extending by k years one person’s life and: 
i) alleviating for k years a certain disability of n people; 
ii) alleviating the disability of one person for l>k years; 
iii) both things, that is, alleviating a certain disability of n people for m years (with m 
larger or smaller than k). 
 
For example, the choice of LYA=1 implies that extending by k years one person’s life is as 
valuable as bringing about a 0.1 alleviation for 2k years in a disability affecting five people 
(or for k/2 years and twenty people, etc.).   
 
4. Discussion 
 
Main findings of this study 
 
We discuss here the recommendations offered by the EALY in the case of the illustrations 
proposed in section 2.2. We account for two possible interpretations of the relation between 
LYA and LYQ. The first interpretation sees LYA and LYQ as genuinely different components 
and focuses on the strict impact of interventions (i.e. the impact of refraining from a life-
saving intervention is confined to the loss of life and does not reverberate to the LYQ 
component). The second interpretation implicitly views LYQ as a function of LYA in the sense 
that when an individual loses her life, her health goes to zero.  
 
Health trumping life case. As shown by the calculations below, in the choice between d’s life 
or h’s health, the EALY recommends intervening on d, regardless of the interpretation given 
to LYQ: 
 
EALY Non Intervention Intervention
Non Intervention Non Intervention Intervention Intervention
1 1 0.7 0.3 1 1
I =EALY -EALY =
          - 0.7
h h h
h h h hLYA LYQ LYA LYQ
 
   
      
  
  
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EALY Non Intervention Intervention
Non Intervention Non Intervention Intervention Intervention
0 1 0.6 0.4 1 1 0.6 0.4
I =EALY -EALY =
          - 1
d d d
d d d dLYA LYQ LYA LYQ
   
   
      
   
   
 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the framework on the basis of the first interpretation (for the sake of a 
more intuitive illustration, the graph is produced in the positive quadrant). It can be seen that 
saving d’s life always outperforms any improvement of h’s health. 
 
[Insert Figure 1] 
 
Following the second interpretation of LYQ, this component goes to zero in the case of non-
intervention and the assessment of the impact on d becomes as follows:  
 
EALY Non Intervention Intervention
Non Intervention Non Intervention Intervention Intervention
0 0 1 1 0.6 0.4
I =EALY -EALY =
          - 1.4
d d d
d d d dLYA LYQ LYA LYQ
 
   
      
   
   
 
 
Figure 2 provides a graphical illustration for this second interpretation. It can be noted that 
EALYI
d
 is an upward translation of 
DALYI
d
 in the figure provided in Appendix –i.e. the red line 
for d is lifted up exactly by 1, which is the LYA=1 component accounting for the life-saving 
character of the intervention.  
 
[Insert Figure 2] 
 
 
Lifeboat dilemma case. Here both d’s and h’s lives are at stake and the interventions relate to 
saving life rather than improving health; it follows that for both d and h the LYA component in 
the case of non-intervention is zero while the LYQ component is not directly affected. A focus 
on the objective of the intervention (in conformity with the first interpretation which keeps 
the two components independent from each other), leads to the outcome that the two life-
saving interventions are given the same importance –in accordance with the LE principle. The 
second interpretation instead imposes the collapse of the LYQ component in case of non-
intervention (because the person would die); as a consequence, since this component is 
greater for h, the intervention saving her life would acquire more value –in contrast with the 
LE principle. In other words, analytically, the avoidance of the discrimination of d in a 
lifeboat dilemma situation is grounded in the independence of the LYA and LYQ components.  
 
The translation of this analysis in society simply requires summing this measure across 
individuals. Consider the evaluation of two interventions on two societies of 100 people. 
Intervention X saves the life of 40 people, of which 10 have a 0.4 disability, 10 a 0.6 
disability and 20 a 0.8 disability; in addition, intervention X alleviates by 0.4 the disability of 
25 people, by 0.6 the d/disability of 20 people and by 0.8 the disability of 15 people. 
Intervention Y does not saves lives, but it alleviates by 0.4 the disability of 30 people, by 0.6 
the disability of 30 people and by 0.8 the disability of 40 people. The EALY measures see 
more favourably intervention X, while the DALY measure suggests intervention Y. 
 
What is already known on this topic  
 
It is worth pointing out that the EALY differs significantly from the other proposals to 
address the disability objection. Nord et al. (1999) increase the value of life extension 
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compared to health improvement through multiplicative weights and an upper end 
compression of health states, which “would eliminate much of this devaluation of life 
extending programmes for the disabled” (p. 36), an approach which can also be found in Nord 
(1999, pp. 118-120) and Ubel et. al. (2000). The separation of life extension and health 
improvement is implemented by adopting the values attached to health states (e.g. Tab. 14 in 
Nord, 1999) in the case of health improving interventions, while life-saving interventions are 
attached a value strictly equal to 1.  
 
What this study adds 
 
The difference with our proposal is neat and resides in the ability of our fixed-plus-variable 
framework to disentangle and jointly account for both life-saving and health-improvement 
interventions. These differences can also be appreciated in the light of the following example 
from Ubel et al. (2000): “Treatment A saves the life of a patient with a … [0.2] disability. 
Treatment B simultaneously saves the patient's life and cures her of a similarly severe 
disability. In the QALY model, treatment A would yield 0.8 QALY, and treatment B would 
yield 1 QALY. Yet in our model, both would have a societal value of 1” (Ubel et. al., 2000, p. 
899). This is different from our fixed-plus-variable approach because treatments A and B 
would have a value of 1 and 1.2, respectively.  Ubel et. al. (2000) argues that their model’s 
inability to recognise the greater value generated by treatment A is less worrying than the 
DALY’s undervaluing of life-saving treatments for disabled people. Finally, it is worth 
noticing that the DALY would be able to accommodate LS if its disability weights (which are 
derived through surveys) were capped at 0.5.  
 
 
Limitations or this study 
 
While DALY’s deliberative approach is extremely valuable (yet see the methodological 
critiques in Voigt and King, 2014), we believe that the analyst can limit its scope in order to 
avoid undesired consequences such as undesirable discriminations (of which most likely 
respondents are not fully aware) –weights could still be determined through surveys but with 
a ceiling in order to avoid disability-based discriminations. 
 
5. Conclusion 
  
This paper addressed the concern that DALY-type measures discriminate against disabled 
people as they give less credit to health interventions that save the lives of disabled, as 
opposed to non-disabled, people, and allow priority to be given to health-improving 
interventions over life-saving interventions when the life at stake is that of a disabled person 
(while the same does not happen if the life to be saved is of a non-disabled person). We 
proposed a new measure, the EALY, and discussed it in light of three principles concerning 
disability alleviation and life-saving decisions. The EALY measure is sensitive to the amount 
of health improvement brought about by an intervention but, at the same time, gives priority 
to saving life over health improvement. As we remark, the importance attributed to saving life 
should not be taken as a sort of life-saving fundamentalism; we abstract from futile medical 
care situations and the priority to life saving interventions is intended in per-year terms. As to 
discrimination against the disabled stemming from the choice of saving the life of a healthy 
person over that of a disabled, the EALY framework illustrates that this can be avoided by 
keeping the life and the disability components separate and accounting only for the direct 
impact of interventions; in this way life-saving interventions are deemed equally worthwhile 
regardless of whose life is saved. When evaluating the ethical value of interventions, we may 
have to take other factors into account and depart from the goal of health maximisation. After 
all, it is by doing this that we leave Sparta’s cliff behind.  
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Appendix 1 
 
To see why the DALY leads to what we see as an undesirable behaviour, let us first formalise 
the net impact in terms of DALY (call this impact 
DALYI ) as the difference between what the 
burden would be in the case of non intervention (call this 
Non InterventionDALY ) and in the case 
of intervention (call this 
InterventionDALY ). Superscripts h and d will denote the person the 
impact refers to (so that mean 
DALYI
h
 and 
DALYI
d
 will denote the impact for h and d, 
respectively): 
 
DALY Non Intervention Intervention
20*0.7 14 YLD 20*0 0 YLD
I = DALY -DALY =14h h h
 
 
 
DALY Non Intervention Intervention
20 YLL 20*0.6 12 YLD
I = DALY -DALY 8d d d

  
 
DALYI
h
 measures the net DALYs which would be averted by intervening on our healthy person 
h who acquires a disability. Per year, DALY0<I 1
h  : it ranges from a number close to 0 (in the 
case of a mild disability) to a number close to 1 (in the case of a severe disability). 
 
DALYI
d
 measures the net DALYs which would be averted by intervening on our disabled or ill 
person d whose life is threatened. The situation is in a sense symmetric to the one just seen, 
with a range of DALY0<I 1
d   per year: from a number close to 0 (in the case of a severe 
disability) to a number close to 1 (in the case of a mild disability). 
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Before generalising the problem, a few observations emerge. It is evident that 
DALYI
h
 and 
DALYI
d
 move within the same range from 0 to 1, and the former will exceed the latter 
whenever the disability which h would develop in case of non-intervention is more severe 
than the disability already afflicting d. The more severe someone’s disability the less valuable 
it would be to save her life; by contrast, the more severe the disability the healthy person 
faces, the greater the concern for her. In fact in the DALY, saving a life does not have any 
intrinsic importance: it all depends on the severities of the disabilities affecting d and 
potentially affecting h. 
 
Generalising the DALY framework in a situation such as the one described above, let 
Int
d  
and 
NonInt
d  denote the discounting factors which would be applied to the remaining years of 
life of d, in the case of intervention and non intervention, respectively; the corresponding 
variables for h would be 
Int
h  and NonInt
h , respectively. These discounting factors are the 
disability weights that would be applied to remaining life years of d and h in the case of 
intervention or non intervention.  The decision to target h will be taken whenever 
NonInt Int NonInt Int- -
h h d d    . Noting that NonInt 1
d   (because d would die and each YLL is 
counted 1) and 
Int 0
h   (because h’s health would be fully restored), the above inequality 
becomes 
NonInt Int1
h d   . 
 
The terms of this inequality are can be represented graphically in Figure 1 below. In the 
horizontal axis we have the discounting factor (or disability weight); in the left and right 
vertical axes we have the yearly DALYs averted if we intervene on d and h, respectively. In 
the figures below what appears in red refers to person d while what appears in blue refers to 
person h.   
i. 
Int1
d  has a negative slope and an intercept of 1 (if d’s disability is very 
mild, saving her life would avert almost a whole DALY; conversely, if her 
disability is very severe then almost no DALY per year would be averted by 
extending her life).  
ii. 
NonInt
h  is positively sloped and has no intercept (if the disability h would get 
in the case of no intervention is very mild, intervening would avert almost no 
DALYs; conversely, if the potential disability is very severe almost a whole 
DALY per year would be averted). 
 
[Insert Figure 3] 
